报告题目：Mutual Risk Sharing and FinTech: The Case of Xianghubao
报告时间：2021年6月18日（周五）15:00—16:00
报告地点：翡翠科教楼B座 1004
报 告 人：吴文锋 教授
主办单位：威斯尼斯人5845cc国际官网
报告人简介：吴文锋，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副院长，金融学教授。2016年首批教育部长江青年学者，2012年获得首批国家优秀青年科学基金，2008年入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划。入选2019年改革开放以来中国经济学类高被引作者和2020年爱思唯尔中国高被引作者。吴文锋教授目前担任《China Finance Review International》执行主编、教育部金融类专业教学指导委员会委员、上海市金融工程研究会理事长等职务，主持国家自然科学基金重点项目、国家社会科学基金重大项目等，曾获“凯原十佳教师”、“唐立新教学名师奖”、上海市优秀教学成果奖等多个教学成果奖。
内容摘要：Literally meaning “mutual protection”, Xiang Hu Bao (XHB) is a novel online platform operated by Alibaba's Ant Financial to facilitate mutual risk sharing of critical illness exposures among participants. There are three major distinctions between XHB and traditional insurance products. First, XHB leverages the tech giant's platform and digital technology to lower enrollment and claim processing costs. Second, different from insurance products applying sophisticated actuarial pricing models, XHB collects no premiums ex ante from its members instead equally allocates indemnities and administrative costs among participants ex post after each claims period. Third, XHB restricts coverage amount, which is less than typical critical illness insurance products, particularly for older participants. We show that the third feature of XHB can lead to separating equilibrium, a la Rothschild-Stiglitz, where low-risk individuals enroll in XHB while high-risk individuals purchase critical illness insurance. Proprietary data from XHB shows that the incidence rate of the covered illness among XHB members is indeed far below that of comparable critical illness insurance across different age groups. Our findings further suggest the role of advantageous selection in explaining the cost advantages of the Fintech-based mutual protection programs.
